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Abstract
Based on the foundational aspects which have been discussed as consequences
of ongoing research on loop quantum gravity in the first part of this paper, the
holistic aspects of the latter are discussed in this second part, aiming at a consi-
stent and systematic approach to eventually model a hierarchically ordered ar-
chitecture of the world which is encompassing all of what there actually is. The
idea is to clarify the explicit relationship between physics and philosophy on the
one hand, and philosophy and the sciences in general, on the other. It is shown
that the ontological determination of worldliness is practically identical with its
epistemological determination so that the (scientific) activity of modelling and
representing the world can be visualized itself as a (worldly) mode of being.
Introduction
We have seen in the first part of this present paper [1] that a clear distinction
between the (physical) world and its foundation has not very often been the to-
pic of conceptualizing ongoing research in modern physics. The same is even
more pertinent as to the holistic aspects of this approach: The point is that if we
visualize some abstract mathematical structure as representing what we can infer
about some suitable foundational basis of the world, provided consistency is
being secured in terms of being able to actually derive what we know about the
world from that structure, then this representation serves as a mode of descripti-
on of all what there actually is in worldly terms, i.e. it is not only referring to the
world as it can be described in terms of physics, chemistry, and biology (or
computer science), but also in terms of psychology, sociology, economics, and
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everything else. In other words: It is our usual perception of everyday life map-
ped as a gross average of all what there is that is nothing but a collection of as-
pects of the (universally) underlying being of worldliness as it can be visualized
under the perspective of the human mode of being. And within the course of
communication, these aspects are permanently phrased into a propositional form
which is governed by the appropriate language chosen. Hence, the ordering of
available modelling procedures is itself a linguistic aspect. Such fairly traditio-
nal insight of philosophy [2] is however alien to modern science, despite its
formal language (mathematics) being only a special case of the aforementioned.
This is mainly so because the primary task of science is to deal with the world as
it can be perceived (observed). Hence, science is exclusively aiming at the empi-
rical world, not at its foundation. And this empirical world is visualized moreo-
ver as a stratified set of regions accessible to various, more or less disjoint,
disciplines. It is only because of the conceptual „competition“ between (classi-
cal) relativity theory on the one hand and quantum theory on the other therefore,
that theory has been forced to conceptually „leave“ this empirical world in order
to find a common foundation for both these basically incompatible theories each
of which claim to describe one and the same Universe.
The important consequence is after all, that the modelling (i.e. observing, con-
ceptualizing, and re-constructing) of the world itself turns out to be part of the
process it is going to model in the first place. In other words: If we call the sub-
tratum of the world „matter“ (or more precisely: „space-time-matter“), then
thinking itself is nothing but a form of this matter. It is probably a very complex
form as to that, but it is basically nothing else than that sort of matter which is
available from the beginning on, and this is physical matter. However, as we
have seen before, though the world can be visualized in terms of physical mat-
ter, matter is not already substance. Instead, substance is the world’s (and hence
matter’s) foundation. Nevertheless, if thinking of the physical world, we are ba-
sically thinking of its „framework categories“ which are space, time, and matter.
And those are the categories with respect to which we actually phrase our pro-
positions, in the first place.
Note that what we advocate here is not necessarily a sort of classical reductio-
nism, nor is it something which could be summarized as „naturalism“ or mere
„materialism“: First of all, we have to take care of the differentiating power of
our arguments. (If everything is matter and/or nature, then nothing is.) Hence,
the crucial point is that each level of complexity (of the observable world) has a
common boundary with some higher level, as well as with some lower level, but
that obviously, all these (worldly) levels of structure are irreducible with repect
to each other. [3] This is so because lower levels are „sublated“ within higher
levels in the threefold Hegelian sense of the meaning of „to sublate“ (namely: to
raise, to conserve, and to abolish, at the same time). In this sense, as Thomas
Kuhn has shown some time ago, Newtonian physics e.g. shows up as a special
case of relativity, if a certain limit of the latter is being taken in terms of para-
meters which are part of the theory. But in cognitive terms, this is a different
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outcome as compared to the period when relativity theory was yet unknown.
Both cases (visualizing Newtonian physics as a special case, and visualizing the
whole of mechanics in terms of Newtonian physics) differ in their space of im-
plications. The latter has been enlarged by now. Hence, their associated
viewpoints are irreducible.
The reason for this is mainly that humans have to think sequentially – collecting
one argument after the other. They are digitalizing the world which primarily
shows up as an analogous process in order to be able to conceptualize it. Irredu-
cibility therefore, is a cognitive analogue of temporality. This is also the reason
for calling the materialism put forward here „transcendental materialism“, be-
cause the word „transcendental“ implies that the substratum discussed is not al-
ready substance itself: The foundation of the world is not accessible to an inha-
bitant of that world, due to the fact that perception is restricted. (There is an
evolutionary aspect to that, because humans have not developed their cognitive
capabilities for being able to do science and/or philosophy and/or art, but rather
for being able to survive under given conditions. Hence, all these research acti-
vities form part of this permanent improvement of survival capacities, but spe-
culating about the foundation is a result of some kind of „excess capacity“ clo-
sely related to a necessary „space of free play“ serving the increase of flexibility
(resilience) of evolution.) Moreover: The observed process (of evolution) can be
thought of as a „self-process“ of the underlying foundation. Or rather: as a self-
explication of the latter.
On the other hand, second, when all of this stuctural hierarchy is, as we know by
now, simply a property of human perception according to which the world is
actually being modeled, then in principle, the world as being visualized in terms
of a complex hierarchy of forms is nothing but the (epistemological) representa-
tion of what humans can grasp of the underlying substance, given their perspec-
tive which is developed according to what they can perceive. Hence, instead of
being an indication of the world’s complexity, the observed hierarchy of forms
is nothing but an indication for human reflexion’s tendency to actually simplify
what it perceives. Despite the obvious complexity of the world therefore, this
world is, as it turns out, much less complex than its foundation. The point is that
reflexion means reduction of complexity, in the first place. [4] And this can be
visualized as the characteristic human activity indeed: to model the world in a
simplified way in order to make it tractable for human praxis.
In the following we will discuss some consequences of this viewpoint: First of
all, we will have a look at the important role of language as a mode of semiolo-
gical communication governing the process of modelling. We start with some
formal preparations of this (section 1) and continue then with its cognitive as-
pects. (section 2) Human graphism is a significant example for the process of
abstraction which is underlying the modelling of the world. (section 3) We will
notice that this is also the foundation of any suitable concept of consciousness
which we can re-couple therefore to our formal starting point. (section 4) We
will visualize then „daily life“ as a kind of coarse graining of this cognitive cor-
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respondence. (section 5) And we will try to draw some ethical conclusions from
these results. (section 6)
1 The Transition from Logic to Hermeneutic
So everything starts with language. Or to be more precise: It starts with the
communication of (reflexive) thoughts and its mapping in terms of appropriate
scripture. If we visualize a language as a collection of lexicology, syntax, and
semantics, then we have to look for the correspondence between its phonology
and its graphology first. We can think of oral language as a category ORL who-
se objects are phonemes and whose morphisms are rules that produce chains of
phones (tones) which are meaningful. Correspondingly, scripture (written lan-
guage) is a category SCRPT whose objects are graphemes and whose mor-
phisms are rules that produce chains of letters. Writing then, is simply a functor
ORL → SCRPT. There is also a formal correspondence between the detailed
structuring of the morphisms in ORL and that in SCRPT being cared of by this
functor. Additionally, there are some more criteria of form such as eugraphical
and/or rhythmic aspects (of syllables e.g.), and there is a characteristic sub-
structuring of the respective lexicology, syntax, and semantics. While the first
(lexicology) is dealing with the form of words (conjugation) and with their
functions (tempus, modus, genus), the second is simply a system which asso-
ciates structure descriptions with propositions. In other words: A syntax is a sy-
stem of rules which models the consistent distribution of word forms. Referring
to earlier work by Chomsky [5], we call a grammar generative, if it provides for
the consistent association of three basic components: syntactic (relating to in-
formation which is necessary to identify and/or interpret propositions), phonolo-
gical (relating to information necessary to interpret the phonetic structure, thus
mapping the syntactic structure to the phonetic), and semantic (mapping the
syntactic structure to the appropriate meaning). Hence, it is the syntactic structu-
re of a language that specifies its deep structure (as to its semantic interpretati-
on) as well as its surface structure (as to its phonetic interpretation). Note that
„interpretation“ here is still referring to the technical aspects of propositional
ordering, not yet to the full hermeneutic process, although the former is ob-
viously being placed at the beginning of the latter. The reason for this is mainly
that the ordering principles in the sense of the syntax have to be checked in the
first place, before one would be able to actually extract the (probably) correct
meaning of what has been said or written. In order to display the systematic of a
language in more detail, there are well-known examples of graphic mappings
which represent the detailed structure of a syntax as introduced by Chomsky in
terms of suitable tree diagrams ([5], p.90) of the type:
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P
      ↓      
                                                     NP   Aux  VP
↓      ↓       
  N     M  V   NP
                          
                    Det   N
All of the links are directed here, and standard abbreviations have been used for
the various terms (P: proposition, VP: verbal phrase, NP: nominal phrase, Det:
determinator, N: nomen, Aux: auxiliary phrase, M: modal verb). Phrase markers
of this type indicate that the syntax can be mapped in detail by means of directed
graphs, i.e. in terms of a category PHRS whose objects are vertices and whose
morphisms are edges. In other words: There will be a pair of functors ORL →
PHRS, and SCRPT → PHRS such that both the underlying systematic of the
respective categories as well as their semiotic contents are being represented in
terms of appropriate digraphs. (Note that the symbol strings as those utilized for
scriptures themselves are also contained in these functors.)
We cannot develop a whole theory of languages here by means of categories
(this will be actually done elsewhere [6]). But the important point for us is to
notice that while we are able to represent linguistic aspects in categorial terms,
we can also utilize what we know about their underlying logical consequences.
So in the following we concentrate on the interpretational procedure as it is re-
lated to the analysis of propositions. We use the aforementioned as an insight
into the fact that modelling is essentially based on a systematic of predication.
However, we will not deal with more foundational aspects of linguistics, as they
are being advocated by Chomsky. In particular, we do not share Chomsky’s as-
sumptions on the universality of generative grammars. [7] (For a more detailed
description of linguistic principles refer to the standard volume of Lyons. [8])
But what we do is to stay with the logical consequences of interpretations. This
has been discussed in more detail elsewhere [9], [10], when referring to a sui-
table approach to formalizing the transition from logic to hermeneutic demon-
strating at the same time that the latter can be visualized as a generalized version
of the former, for the case of incomplete information.
In this sense, the description of processes can be mapped in terms of propositi-
ons formulated in some language. Hence, under this perspective, languages alto-
gether can be thought of as being categories whose objects are propositions for-
med out of a given generative grammar including some suitable lexicology,
syntax, and semantics, satisfying rules as laid down above, these rules being im-
plicit in the category’s morphisms. Translation then is a functor between lan-
guage categories mapping objects to objects (propositions to propositions) and
morphisms to morphisms (rules to rules). The idea of this approach is that
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translations are path-dependent with respect to compositions. This can be shown




is not commutative, if A, B, and C mean any natural languages. (The double ar-
row indicates the identity mapping.) But it is commutative, if A, B, and C refer
to different logical languages (i.e. formal languages with different underlying
logics). What we can say is that in the case of the logics, the information (with
respect to the semantics of the propositions utilized, e.g. with a view to applica-
tions in physics) is complete. Hence, translation of propositions is commutative
with respect to the diagram shown above, if we deal with logic. It is thus path-
independent. But for hermeneutic, which shows up here as a generalized logic
for incomplete information, it is path-dependent. (To turn this the other way
round: Logic is a hermeneutic with complete information. Each hermeneutic has
thus its logic nucleus: This means nothing is completely arbitrary. On the con-
trary, there is always a rational aspect which is at the foundation of what is ac-
tually being said about the world.)
2 Semiological Structures of Perception
The important insight of the previous section is that the world shows up as one
which is inherently „questionable“ in the sense that it is offering itself to herme-
neutic interpretation from the beginning on. And it is this „beginning“ which is
initialized in terms of (human) perception. As has been shown earlier in some
more detail [11], the basically anthropological foundation of the mode of per-
ception turns out as the underlying motivation for developing the viewpoint of
what is referred to as „transcendental materialism“. The idea is that perception is
not primary in this sense, but it is „preformatted“ according to the biological
evolution which has been actually taken by humans. In other words: If percepti-
on is a product of the process which is being perceived afterwards, then the cor-
respondence between that perception and what is being perceived is very close
in the first place. Probably, one can speak of a kind of „fine tuning“ which me-
ans that not very many variations of this „preformatting“ appear to be possible.
So what we assume is that not only is perception tuned to the perceivable world,
but also is the mode of modelling the world as a „cognitive work“ operating on
what has been perceived. That is, all means of modelling, such as the pertinent
graphism admitting of diagrammatic representations of models, are actually in-
cluded in this cognitive fine tuning of a product of the world to the rest of this
world.
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While we leave the explicit graphism for the next section, we concentrate here
on the general semiological aspects of perception: As has been shown by Leroi-
Gourhan [12], it is the co-evolution of language and tools technology which re-
sults in an epistemological unification of gesture and tool by means of producing
an explicit sign structure of the world. Signs turn out to be the basic elements of
reflexion, because they combine the task of reflexion, i.e. the abstracting of
symbols from concrete reality in order to constitute a parallel world of language
which is able to act upon reality more effectively, with its communicative aspect
showing up as its narrative structure. The framework categories for this unifica-
tion are space and time: In fact, the association of temporal rhythms with spatial
structures can be interpreted as a domestication of space and time. Social space
therefore, is gaining the connotation of a mapping of space-time geometry in
metaphorical form. (Most critics of this philosophical approach, particularly tho-
se from the fields of science, forget to take this „metaphorization“ into account
when discussing formal analogues as they are utilized sometimes in the philo-
sophical field.)
In so far the cognitive aspect of human beings is turning out as immediate ex-
pression of this aforementioned co-evolution. Piaget has already pointed to the
utilization of category theory [13] when showing that perception and cognition
are based on what he calls „pre-categories“ derived from „rough systems of
morphisms“ in a permanent struggle between invariant forms and transforma-
tions. This is the reason for the structural morphisms which establish a hierarchy
of mediated functors and functor categories to also carry their own internal lo-
gic. In other words: The process of signification itself shows up within an impli-
cit double connotation of representing the intendend structure on the one hand,
and of contextualizing it within a categorial framework of logical consistency on
the other hand.
This has been the basic motivation for discussing consciousness itself in terms
of geometric and/or computational metaphores. (We will come back to this in a
later section.) In a sense, we can visualize the process of modelling the world
according to what can be perceived as a kind of „global algorithm“ which is im-
plemented into the world from the outset. On the other hand, this global sign
structure of the world which is being re-processed all the time within the frame-
work of the fundamental categories of space and time (note the double meaning
of „categories“ here which parallels the corresponding double meaning of the
word „topoi“) can be thought of as being mediated „down“ into the local macro-
and into the individual micro-environment in terms of „local algorithms“ with
respect to chosen strategies of modelling. Hence, „metaphorization“ of the world
is the underlying process of its understanding according to the explicit utilizati-
on of local strategies of hermeneutic signification. (In fact, as it turns out after
all, „hermeneutic signification“ shows up here as a tautology rather.)
The fact that the world presents itself as something which is „questionable“, as
we have mentioned before, shows up in the micro-detail of the process of signi-
fication which is underlying the communicating of the results of modelling the
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world, in terms of a „gap“ between the signifier and its associated significate.
This is what Lacan shows when deriving the process of signification from its
linguistic elements. [14] The signifier is with respect to the significate in a rela-
tion of type S/s, where the „slash“ refers to the fact that there is always a non-
deletable gap between the one and the other such that the signifier is never
capable of exhausting the exact meaning of what is being signified. (Note that
the significate is thought here in terms of phonemes rather than of graphemes.)
A metaphore then, is a kind of transformation of signifiers, written in Lacan’s
terminology as S‘/S x S/s. Hence, „understanding“ what is being said means ba-
sically „transforming metaphores“ within a given context. As Lacan discusses in
more detail, this procedure is at the foundation of most of the psycho-analytic
phenomena. We will not go into these details here, but the important point for us
is that language is thus centred around interpretation, and that social phenomena
(which are always phenomena of communication) derive from that „que-
stionability“ of the world which can be operated upon by modelling it, but which
can never be solved completely. Hence, speaking about the world (as well as
symbolizing/signifying the structure of the world), visualized as an interpretati-
on which because of its communicability is always translation at the same time,
shows up as permanent mis-representation/distortion or transposition (in Freudi-
an terms: „Ent-Stellung“). And this is what causes social phenomena.
But there are two further consequences of this: First of all, this process of per-
manent mis-representation (in the procedure of representing) is the social basis
for innovations. This is so, because each new metaphore acts as an „impertinent
predication“ onto the body of traditional language, and thus unfolds its heuristic
potential. ([15], pp. vi, 87.) In this sense, the metaphore is to common language
(including poetry) what the model is to science. ([15], p.228) It is no coinci-
dence that innovative research can be related in this way to innovative thought
in general. [16]
A second point to that is that the same process is also at the foundation of the
permanent differentiating of differences which is determining the perception
within the world. Deleuze has noted that to seperate substance from attribute (in
the Spinozist tradition of „omnis determinatio est negatio“) is possible by ab-
straction only. Hence, what is being expressed is also veiled at the same time
and needs therefore, further interpretation. [17] In this sense, „expressio“ com-
prises always of both „explicatio“ and „complicatio“. This is the reason for the
fact that traditional metaphores of expression (such as „mirrors“ that reflect or
„germs“ which are expressed in unfolding) point from the beginning on to
graphic means of communication. More recently, Louis Kauffman has presented
similar (though mathematically more rigorous) arguments in favour of founding
the world (spacetime) on constitutive differentiations. [18] In the theory of diffe-
rentiation as it has been presented by Derrida [19], the same aspect is showing
up, because in the double meaning of the word „différance“ (from: différencier
and différer, at the same time) the process of producing differences and the
process of delaying (suspending) the presence (of structure) which is actually
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being produced by this differentiating, is thought of as being set into one. In this
sense, the active articulation of space-time is included in the structure of the dis-
course as it can be described in linguistic terms. We do not argue in favour of
analytical philosophy though (referring to the „linguistic turn“ of philosophy),
because the articulation actually being undertaken has always a material sub-
stratum. In other words: This discursive form of articulation is nothing but a
form of matter itself.
3 Morphogenesis as Unfolding of Graphical Representation
This can be hardly made clearer than by utilizing the insight gained from the
anthropologically underlying graphism which is intrinsic to all forms of discour-
se. As Leroi-Gourhan has shown, the emergence of graphic symbols at the end
of the paleoanthropus period can be interpreted as an indication for a new rela-
tionship between the cooperative poles of hand and face. ([12], ch.VI) The im-
portant point is that the graphism is emerging however from abstraction rather
than from naive actuality. In other words: Graphism does not mean primarily the
mapping of concrete forms. Instead, the realism of mappings is a late product of
a long development. Graphism means also an unfolding of three new (spatial)
dimensions as compared to the one (temporal) dimension which is open to pho-
netic expression. Much later then, it is the linearization of the graphism which
actually creates scripture, but which restricts again this recently gained expressi-
ve freedom. Hence, the basic idea is to visualize the first graphism as a mode of
expression which opens up a true parallel (of equal weight) to phonetic langua-
ge. In this sense, the graphic result is mythographic rather than significative. The
gesture interprets the (spoken) word, and the word comments on the graphism.
But it is the (linear) graphic mapping then which leads to a consequent regula-
rization and thus restriction of symbols. Grammar’s time is approaching. And
here is the root of rationality, because restriction means to actually restrict the
expressive means for the irrational moments of life, in the first place.
This is the reason for the materiality of signification: The application of the
hands in actually producing something could be expressed in terms of gestures
which characterized the „language of the hands“. (This function of the gesture
has not been lost until today.) Its analogue was the (spoken) „language of the
face“. And the first graphism tried to express the gesture in terms of a spatially
fixed copy-picture (or mythogram). Modern scripture and graphic mappings
however, aimed at the transition from the mythographic gesture to the formali-
zed gesture. Standardization of expression, though connected with explicit re-
striction, opened up new horizons of communication. Hence, the universality of
diagrammatic applications, not only within the framework of formalized langua-
ges: Graphic design is always representation. But it is, though strictly regulari-
zed very often, a formal translation of the material gesture. The gap between
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object and mapping cannot be overcome, but abstraction secures the universal
applicability of this modernized (linear) graphism. And, as we have seen, this
abstraction is always of equal weight than the original concretization.
Those are the basic ingredients of assembling knowledge by means of modelling
the world: It is the intrinsic graphism which is securing the relevance of the out-
come. We have a recursive systematic of producing structures by means of mo-
delling and designing (i.e. re-constructing) them in graphical terms: By doing so
we do not leave the cycle of abstraction. We rather circulate them under the
formal and the „natural“ (i.e. hermeneutic) perspectives. This can be indicated





                                       semiology                 mathematics
                                     (herm.) logic               (form.) logic




                                              ←← philosophy  ←←
What is being transported via the route indicated by those arrows is the afore-
mentioned „expressio“ which shows up as both „explicatio“ and „complicatio“.
The empirically found is modelled in terms of physics utilizing the appropriate
mathematical language. The latter is primarily based on a formal logic which
can expressed in terms of an adequate graphic design. (One has only to think of
recent diagrammatic techniques as introduced by knot theory.) Intuitively, this
skeleton of a graphism (heavily restricted by precise rules) can be visualized as a
rudimentary kind of geometrization: Essentially, the utilized graphs do not only
depict spatial and temporal dimensions, but they also transform one type of di-
mension into the other. Categories (and more recently, topoi) are examples for a
static mapping of dynamical phenomena. Philosophy then, is the field which
transforms a formal input into a hermeneutic output in doing essentially two
things: first, isolating basic (epistemic and thus cognitive) structures of scientific
fields in order to unify them into one conceptual whole which can eventually
serve as a presentation of the present totality of the world (this is what science
cannot do), second, delimiting the knowledge gained against what is beyond sci-
ence in principle, thus opening up the perspective as to what is discovered once
the restriction of the formal discourse are lifted somewhat. The latter is what we
call „foundational activity“ of philosophy. The resulting generalized models are
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re-phrased then in terms of a path-dependent, hermeneutic logic of translations
(of meanings). Mathematics is being replaced then by semiology, geometrizati-
on is replaced by metaphorization. The clockwise motion indicates an increasing
context-(and thus path)-dependence of argumentation. The important point is
that although this motion of arguments looses more and more its formal
strictness by means of the increasing relevance of the metaphorical design, it
nevertheless is capable of an innovative, heuristic injection of argument once the
results are being fed back into the available theories of physics. This is the
reason for always having a mixture of these different types of argument in phy-
sical theories rather than pure mathematical arguments only. (A detail Feynman
has actually noticed a long time ago. [20])  This recursive process of producing
knowledge has been discussed in more detail elsewhere. ([9], first reference) But
for us here, it suffices to notice the relevance of the graphism intrinsic to the
process of producing knowledge.
4 The Structure of Consciousness
It is important to realize that the right-hand side of the above diagram depicts a
part of the process which has its macroscopic foundations in language itself.
Hence, it is itself accessible in terms of social philosophy and anthropology. On
the other hand, the left-hand side of the diagram refers to the microscopic foun-
dations of language accessible in terms of psycho-analysis, as we can see when
thinking of the remarks we made earlier with respect to the work of Jacques La-
can. This line of argument has been utilized therefore, for eventually determi-
ning the details of consciousness itself. We cannot discuss this problem here.
This has been done earlier. ([9], second reference) But what we can do is to
collect all those aspects which shed some more light onto the relationship bet-
ween graphism and representation in the modelling of the world.
Starting with what we have learned from dealing with the generic difference
between world and foundation, and thinking of the fact that it is human reflexion
and representation which is actually modelling this difference in the first place,
we can straightforwardly conclude that consciousness, as it is being conceptuali-
zed according to the same sort of modelling, shows up as a classical and thus
emergent property of the world. This rules out any direct quantum approach to
consciousness, because the concept itself is primarily defined in terms of the
„experience“ humans do actually have of it. The quality of experience however,
is a conscious correlate to the brain; and the brain is a macroscopic object. This
does not mean that the brain’s macroscopic behaviour would not be determined
by its microscopic and thus quantum level. But on that level it cannot be experi-
enced, because human perception (as we have seen) is restricted to the classical
level. Also, it cannot be experienced on the fundamental level, because in being
the foundation of the world, it is not its proper part. It is rather to the world what
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possibility is to actuality. Nevertheless, as a possibility, consciousness is in-
herent of course to the foundation. But this does not mean that the fundamental
level is „thinking“ as we know it. Hence, any kind of universal pan-psychism
has to be ruled out as to that. (Note by the way that human reflexion is the ne-
cessary but not sufficient condition for performing actions. The initiation of ac-
tions being undertaken by humans has always a macroscopic quality to it. That
is, ontologically, humans are (classical) parts of their (classical) macro-world.
On this level, their models of the world, although remaining models all the time,
become concrete.
From the beginning on, it has been the main problem of talking about con-
sciousness to define an appropriate relationship between consciousness and
brain. The easiest approach was to visualize this relationship as an analogue to
the relationship between software and hardware. Hence, the computational me-
taphore was being created. By many authors, its difficulties have been located in
the problem of symbolic representation. [21] As we have seen earlier, within the
onto-epistemic view, perception and cognition are closely tied to a generic gra-
phism which is in turn determining the non-separable relationship between re-
flexion and communication (as well as action). On the one hand, this can be
shown when talking about cognitive categories in terms of their being represen-
ted by attractors of connected (and massively parallelly organized) dynamical
systems. ([21], p.5sq.) Because the model of attractors is itself a representation
which can be translated into a suitable graphism. Hence, symbols are mediated
all the time in terms of other symbols, even if on a very basic (if not fundamen-
tal) level, symbols and logical operations are difficult to locate. ([21], p.8) In
fact, as we have seen, it is possible to sketch out a level of quantum computation
in principle. Whether it will be possible to actually connect this level with expli-
cit brain functions on the neurological level, remains another question.
On the other hand, the celebrated counter-argument of Penrose, assuming a ge-
neric non-computability on a basic level of organization, might vanish, if visua-
lized under the perspective of viewing consciousness in classical terms. Becau-
se, on a classical level, a somewhat „fuzzy average“ computability might be
achieved which turns out to be fairly universal. (In fact, this may be interpreted
as a direct hint as to the question why the world is frequently constituted in a
hermeneutical rather than logical manner.)
Visualizing consciousness as an emergent macro-structure of the classical world,
its „software“ is to that of the fundamental level what the user language is to the
machine language. The relationship between the two would be compatible with
the recursive modularity of the brain as it is being discussed in terms of a self-
organizing process according to the principles of self-organized criticality
(SOC), comparable with Conway’s „game of life“ utilized for a model of the
edge-of-chaos type. [22] The proposal is here that this type of dynamics is self-
similar across multiple scales of neural organization (as it is usually the case for
systems in SOC), utilizing a limit-cycle attractor for recognition, participation,
and engagement states, while utilizing a chaotic attractor for ready, receptive,
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and disengaged states. ([22], p.57) Note that even the „machine language“ could
be of a somewhat fuzzy type here so that non-computablity in the sense of Pen-
rose is not challenged. (Leaving aside for the time being what can indeed be
challenged, such as the immanent Platonism of the Penrose approach.) [23]
There is however, a complicated problem of self-reference when dealing with
necessary conditions for consciousness: What we do just now is to think of hu-
mans as a product of a natural evolution which has been actualized all the neces-
sary conditions for the possibility of eventually emergent human beings, starting
from what we call the „Big Bang“ until „recently“ (i.e. some 100.000 years
ago). In other words: There must be galaxies and stars, planetary systems as well
as appropriate physical conditions, first, before it is possible to eventually ac-
tualize human beings on various planets. Hence, the condition for having con-
sciousness as we know it, is the complete history of the Universe itself. (In fact,
this viewpoint is the basis for deriving a principle of cosmological selection
then, as Smolin has done.)
But on the other hand, that this is really the case, is an assumption of telling this
story in the first place, i.e. of modelling the world such that this outcome is
being achieved at all. And we know already that we do our modelling according
to what we perceive and cognitively grasp. We have to admit therefore, that the
picture developed cannot be correct in absolute terms. Because, space and time
have been shown to be framework categories of human thinking. But if so, then
in modelling the world, it is simply pretended that the world has developed in
the aforementioned way, because this assumption is fitting well to what we can
observe. But what we can observe, is not the whole story! We do as if the world
develops within evolution, governed by the categories of space and time which
enter explicitly the formal representation of our models. Doing so works well as
far as a wide range of applications is concerned. But as to a discussion of the
underlying foundation of the world, this is not really telling much.
In order to clarify this important point, we discuss the following: Take, e.g., the
tubulins of the Penrose model again. [24] They are biological entities, and ac-
cording to our view of planetary evolution, we would suppose that it is necessa-
ry to develop the physical, chemical and so forth conditions for biological enti-
ties first, before being able to actually observe living beings which utilize tubu-
lins in their consciousness. On the other hand: If there would be nothing else
than the quantum mechanical equivalent to what tubulins (according to Penrose)
are actually doing, then we would not really expect to have consciousness after
all. If indeed consciousness should be implemented on a more fundamental level
(as Hameroff mentions referring to the Platonian view of Penrose), then we
would expect that it is not consciousness as we know it, but rather some potenti-
al form of it (and this is not the same). Probably, the term „panexperientialism“
in the sense of Whitehead ([23], p.136) is also not quite to the point. At most,
some sort of „prototype consciousness“ could be visualized on the fundamental
level as mentioned before. (It is unlikely that spin networks could „have experi-
ence“ in the sense we are used to handle it.)
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Hence, we cannot really claim that „the Universe (on some fundamental level) is
conscious“, but what we can say instead is that it encompasses the possibility of
consciousness (as we know it). It includes it in its field of possibilities, because
it has an informational structure (of quantum nature) which is the necessary (but
not sufficient) condition for consciousness. This argument can be transferred to
the Penrose-Hameroff model: It is not actually said here that consciousness is
functioning in quantum terms or even that it would be quantum indeed, but rat-
her that what we call (classical) „consciousness“ as a macroscopic phenomenon
is a derivative of what goes on at the fundamental level. And if we probe the fi-
ne structure of this quantum level (and beyond), we would find that the roots of
consciousness are deeply embedded in conditions of quantum information. Al-
though tubulins then, could be discussed in terms of quantum theory, the basic
argument here would not be changed. [24]
Note that if consciousness emerges in the cosmological era of classical bits
(which is actually the same as saying that we put a condition on the history of
the Universe!), then physical observers will utilize a Boolean logic. In terms of
this Boolean (i.e. classical) logic, it may be actually helpful to apply the afore-
mentioned functor Past. The point is that applying this functor leads to a back
projection of the Universe as it has become now (at observer time) onto its ori-
gin, if visualized in terms of categories of space and time. This projection must
find its natural endpoint at the boundary of the classical domain. This means
nothing else than stating that the historical viewpoint under which the Universe
can be described, is closely tied to the concept we develop of the human con-
sciousness, in the first place. And it breaks down at the quantum level.
5 Modelling Everyday Life (Conclusion I)
We arrive now at two (short) conclusions of this. The first deals with the philo-
sophical consequences as to human orientation within the world. It will be topic
of this present section. The second deals with the ethical implications of this,
and will be topic of the next section.
First of all, it should be noticed that we have not actually shown the derivational
dependence of all what there is from its underlying foundation. What we have
done instead is to argue in favour of the principles of this dependence and then
to look for indications that demonstrate the plausibility of their assumption.
Hence, we have basically argued in a heuristic manner, and this is essentially
what the philosophical approach to science, the taking in sight of what physics
has to offer, actually means.
Note that we have not argued in the manner of what is usually referred to as
„analytical philosophy“, because despite our interest in language, we have not
forgotten that there actually is something about which language speaks. The
point is that philosophy of science cannot be based on the available (scientific)
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theories alone, in so far as they are simply sets (or categories rather) of proposi-
tions which satisfy certain pre-defined rules. More than that there is also a „me-
taphysical“ base point from where we have to argue, thus projecting an intrinsic
(if not generic) systematic framework onto the aforementioned theories. This
base point in turn, is derived from general rules of philosophical thinking, in the
first place. The „theorem of sufficient reason“, „Ockam’s razor“, or simply, the
„principle of thought line consistence“ ([9], first two references) are only a few
examples for these rules. Another one is the primary difference between world
and foundation. Hence, although these general rules do not actually interfere
with ongoing practical research, they nevertheless re-structure the actual set of
(still heuristic) starting points for any scientific enterprise. (This is, as mentioned
before, what Feynman had noticed some time ago.)
What we have actually shown however, is that these heuristic aspects emerge
from a line of thought which characterizes aspects of substance metaphysics.
Obviously, this must be a modern sort of metaphysics today, as we cannot go
back anymore to the state of knowledge as it was common some 300 years in
our past. Hence, and we have argued thus, it is „transcendental materialism“
which points to an innovative approach toward these aspects. Nevertheless, one
basic result of ancient metaphysics has not changed at all until today: This is the
fact that once we accept its underlying assumptions, we have to admit their uni-
versality for all what there actually is in onto-epistemic terms. Of course, kno-
wing that physics is at the „bottom“ of all what there is including everyday life
in all its detailed aspects, does not save us having to do the „hard work“. That is,
it will be extremely unlikely that one day we might develop some sort of „beha-
vioural physics“ (as Comte originally thought 200 years ago). We will have to
describe all the various fields according to their appropriate level of complexity
in their own language, and we cannot expect to eventually replace psycho-
analysis or economics by physics or quantum gravity.
But the insight we actually gain by knowing this, is more a heuristic insight into
what kind of orientation humans should be involved in the future. Hence, this
insight develops an eventually normative function, and leads therefore to a re-
consideration of ethical aspects of human life. According to an expression of
Hogrebe, we can call this a „fundamental heuristics.“ [25]
6 Rationality as Ethical Implication (Conclusion II)
But note also something else: In a completely different field, namely that of ur-
ban planning, it has been shown recently how the holistic conception of practi-
cally „embedding“ the intended topic into its structural background based on
elementary principles of evolution deriving from a suitably chosen foundation is
not only present in every technical detail of daily life, but also unfolds normative
power within its framework. [26] In fact, as it turns out, the results exhibited by
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a close analysis of the various aspects of city life point towards what we may
justifiably call „metaphysical implications“. This viewpoint is still not very
common within European science. On the other hand, nobody (including most
of the scientists) would doubt the justification of Asian „metaphysical“ archi-
tecture when applying principles such as those of the Feng Shui to the actual
erection of buildings. (In fact, the Needham institute in Cambridge (UK) is built
according to these principles.) And it is not very difficult to recognize harmoni-
zing aspects within Asian city structure such as displaying the existence of „dif-
ference within a framework of repetition“. However, as Henri Lefebvre has
pointed out some time ago ( cf. [27], pp. 157sq.), this Asian structure of social
space has one serious drawback: it is an attribute of power. It implies and is im-
plied by divinity and empire, and it thus combines knowledge with power. Na-
ture (whether available or constructed) is harmonized according to a hierarchy
of principles which explicitly centres around the emperor, i.e. the representation
of a feudal system. Obviously, this is something which explicitly contradicts the
insight gained in the period of European enlightenment. Hence, contrary to the
Asian approach, introducing the concept of de-centralization into the city struc-
ture reflects a fundamentally European approach so as to deal with these „meta-
physical“ aspects of daily life. Indeed, as we can find out when analyzing va-
rious fields in detail, de-centralization is not only a secularized principle of so-
cial organization, but also a basic principle of evolutionary processes abundant
in nature (if visualized in terms of modern European science). This illustrates
clearly that ethical implications of this „metaphysical“ background are always
present: In fact, we realize this in the very catalogue of (technical) measures ta-
ken when thinking of the underlying objectives showing up within the details of
urban planning. It is not a coincidence that these implications are tied to legal
aspects of democratic policies such as defining technical rights (e.g. of pedestri-
ans) with respect to the human rights convention.
The point is that the decision for utilizing scientific methods is from the begin-
ning on a decision for choosing an onto-epistemic approach to the world. Hence,
it is also a decision in favour of acknowledging a rational nucleus of all what
humans can perform within their environment. This aspect is important when
thinking of the fact that contrary to what is usually claimed, political decisions
are almost always based on emotional and explicitly irrational rather than on ra-
tional aspects. Nevertheless, ethics is the „science“ (if you like) of what is ade-
quate. This is the difference between ethics and morality: The former tells us
what is adequate or not according to what we presently know, the latter values
what is good and bad according to what we presently believe. Hence, politics, or
rather its practical application in daily life in terms of elections, planning, exe-
cutive actions and so forth (we are only talking about political systems which
are based on principles of European democratic, legal, and republican thought),
is usually judged following the prejudiced structure of traditional morality, and
not, as it should be, the objective structure of rational ethics. The point is that the
ancient problem of the Big Revolutions of the 18th century (the American, and
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the French), namely the transformation of the bourgois into the citoyen has not
been solved lately. But if this cannot be achieved, it could be possible perhaps to
approach a more modest objective: namely to transform the respective instituti-
ons instead, especially, if they are already of the democratic, legal, and republi-
can type.
But beyond this layer of everyday politics, there is another, deeper layer of the
intrinsic mediation of the ontological and epistemological levels of modelling
the world and pratically behaving accordingly. In fact, if the Santa Fe school, or
some of its individual protagonists, or protagonists from its vicinity, like Stuart
Kauffman, Per Bak, and also Lee Smolin, talk about evolutionary principles on a
fundamental level of nature (of which humans are a product), then what they
actually do (perhaps without realizing this very clearly) is to aim at this intrinsic
mediation and to connect it to an explictly ethical perspective (though the out-
come might be different as can be seen by the detailed views of all of them).
Hence, to visualize, as we put forward here, the world and everything what there
is (including the city as a special example) as an emergent computational system
consisting of massively parallel microworlds eventually creating an observable
macroworld, means to apply the computational paradigm in an ethical perspecti-
ve: If there is a computational paradigm, then there is a realistic possibility for
an algorithmic approach to the world. It is mathematical logic in fact which pro-
vides this algorithm. And although we have to accept that many aspects of hu-
man life within social systems cannot be completely modelled according to ma-
thematical procedures, what we can do nevertheless, is to notify the logical
nucleus in all what there is, and this is the rational nucleus, at the same time.
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